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IN-MIGRANTS AND EXCLUSION IN EAST
AFRICAN RANGELANDS: ACCESS, TENURE
AND CONFLICT
Katherine Homewood
Ernestina Coast
Michael Thompson
East African rangelands, though limited by aridity and seasonality, are
fertile areas supporting major livestock production systems, spectacular
wildlife populations, and, increasingly, smallholder and large-scale
commercial farming. While they have for centuries been dominated
by pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples, the key resources (water and
fertile land) have continually been contested by different ethnic and
occupational groups. Mobility, in-migration, resource competition,
negotiated access, conflict, and assimilation have thus remained
perennial issues throughout their history. In the course of the twentieth
century, ever larger areas have been expropriated for conservation or
cultivation (e.g. Homewood and Rodgers 1991; Igoe and Brockington
1999; Ndagala 1990b; Fratkin 2001), with formerly fluid boundaries
crystallising into legally defined, often patrolled and/or fenced, exclusion
zones (Homewood 1995). Outbreaks of violence in East African
rangelands have been variously presented as: Malthusian competition
across ethnic and economic fault lines due to resource availability
declines (Ndagala 1992a; Otieno 2002a, 2002b); resource competition
between minority (resident) and majority (colonising) ethnic groups
(Ole Kuney 1994; Africa Law Review 1998); part of a direct response
of marginalised people to systematic dispossession (Shivji and Kapinga
1998; Munei and Galaty 1999); orchestrated events stage-managed by
an elite seeking to retain monopoly on power and resources (Klopp
2001); or some combination of these political and environmental
pressures and responses (Dietz 1996). However, within this broad
range of contributing factors, in-migration is repeatedly identified both
by local people and by outside observers as a source of tension (e.g. Ole
Kuney 1994; Munei and Galaty 1999; Klopp 2001).
The present paper makes a comparative analysis of access to and
control of resources by households of different duration of residence
and ethnic affiliation in buffer zones surrounding the Serengeti-Mara
Ecosystem (SME), which straddles the Kenya–Tanzania border. Our
study describes patterns of tenure and access among Maasailand
inhabitants in the two countries, and the extent to which the
competition and inequalities they reveal are consistent with current
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varying interpretations and theories of conflict in developing nations
(Stewart 2002; Klugman et al. 1999; Hussein 1998; Kurimoto and
Simonse 1998). The cross-border comparisons make it possible to
contrast the outcomes of comparable ethnicities, economic systems
and ecological processes in the different national economic and
political contexts of Kenya and Tanzania. The discussion examines
how trajectories of exclusion and socio-economic change have been
influenced by contrasting national and regional policies, and have in
turn influenced social cohesion, or conversely, conflict. We focus on
the following research questions:
1. Are patterns of tenure and resource access or control in SME associated
with duration of residence and/or with in-migrant status?
2. Are patterns of tenure and resource access or control in SME associated
with ethnicity?
3. How do patterns of tenure and access to or control of resources in SME
differ between Kenya and Tanzania study sites?
4. To what extent are patterns of access to and control over resources, and
associated patterns of conflict, consistent with current theories on origins
of violent conflict in developing countries in general, and East Africa
in particular?
5. How have trajectories of tenure and access on the one hand, and dispos-
session and poverty on the other, been influenced by contrasting national
and regional policies? What policy insights do these findings suggest?
The paper uses empirical data to provide the first quantitative cross-
border comparison of the ways in which tenure and access are influenced
by ethnicity and migration status in SME, and on the similarities
and contrasts resulting from the different national contexts of Kenya
and Tanzania as well as their expression through local policy in the
study sites.
BACKGROUND: LAND TENURE, ACCESS AND CONFLICT IN MAASAILAND
Oral histories and colonial archives show the Central Rift Valley and
adjacent highlands were dominated by Maa-speaking peoples from the
seventeenth century on, with a history of mobility, migration and social
assimilation punctuated by devastating episodes of warfare, drought and
disease (Homewood and Rodgers 1991; Spear and Waller 1993; Waller
1988). Maa-speaking peoples were organised into geographic sections
and locations (see e.g. Spear and Waller 1993) cross-cut by clan,
age set and stock friendship relations (e.g. Ndagala 1990a; Potkanski
1994). Membership of these social networks structured customary
systems of access to communal resources. Within any one location,
access was decided by elders, regulated, and penalties for infringement
enforced where necessary by warrior age sets, who also played a part
in challenging as well as in enforcing the decisions of their elders
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(Spencer 1988). Current work suggests women played an active part
in management and decision-making, but that from the advent of the
colonial period, they were progressively excluded from rights over land,
livestock and resource management and became juridical minors and
dependents (Hodgson 2000). Access by outsiders, whether to temporary
use of resources, or to longer-term membership of the group, was
open to negotiation. Newcomers could develop political alliances with
established families through gifts, stock alliances, intermarriage and
adoption (Brockington 2002; Waller 1993; Spear and Waller 1993).
Competition might repeatedly erupt into conflict, raiding and violence,
but until recently such conflict remained at a level which could be
contained and resolved by customary means through mediation by
elders (cf. Kurimoto and Simonse 1998; Fleischer 1999; Christiansson
and Tobisson 1989). Permeable social and spatial boundaries made it
possible to respond rapidly in a variable and unpredictable environment
(Ndagala 1990a). This framework of natural resource management was
disrupted at the end of the nineteenth century when the Maasai and their
herds were decimated by warfare, human and animal epidemics (Waller
1988; Dawson 1979). The next two sections outline subsequent trends
in land tenure, access and conflict in Kenya and Tanzania throughout
the twentieth century.
Kenya Maasailand
Maasai were traditionally guided in ritual matters, including military
strategy, by elders, sometimes by women, and by their prophets (laibon)
who were especially responsible for some age-set rituals. Each age
set nominated its own spokesmen (laigwenak). Colonial indirect rule
was established in the early twentieth century with appointed chiefs,
initiating an alternative legal system and hierarchy of power. As the
incoming colonial administration took over land for white settler use,
Kenya Maasai were moved (voluntarily or by force) from Laikipia and
other northern rangelands and concentrated into the then Southern
Masai Reserve, now Narok and Kajiado Districts (Waller 1988;
Anderson 2002; Klopp 2001). The colonial administration classed
this as:
‘trust land’, that is public land controlled by the government in ‘trust’ for the
Maasai, a status that much land has maintained in the post Independence
period. . .. the Maasai reserve . . . [was] . . . a ‘closed district’, colonial
administrators attempted to create an ethnically pure enclave that fitted
their notions of a tribe. [Klopp 2001: 487]
This planted the seeds of an ethnic dimension that would in due course
affect future decisions over land allocation, as well as creating the
administrative structures that would manage and control such decisions.
The colonial designation of a Maasai reserve imposed clear spatial
and social boundaries where more fluid interactions had prevailed.
It placed control over allocation of what had been communal land
in the hands of colonially appointed Maasai chiefs and local Maasai
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leaders as well as the district and provincial administration (Klopp
2001). Trust land was, and is, meant to be managed in the interests
of customary users, avoiding alienation among other outcomes (Okoth-
Ogendo 2000). However, following Independence in 1963 the Kenyan
government, encouraged by the World Bank, began to divide Maasai
rangelands into individual, corporate and group ranches. Group ranch
leaders emerged from, or became part of, the local elite (see case
study 1; Galaty 1980, 1993, 1994, 1999; Rutten 1992). Group ranch
management elections have in practice been held infrequently, if at all,
since the time of group ranch formation.1 As some members of the
Maasai elite began to acquire and deal in individual titles, and ordinary
members saw little benefit or revenues from group title, pressure built
for group ranches to be subdivided into individual holdings (Munei and
Galaty 1999; Rutten 1992). This is a process that continues today in
Narok District (Thompson and Homewood 2002). The process and
implications of the privatisation of land in Kenya Maasailand have been
extensively documented and analysed (particularly Galaty 1980, 1994,
1999; Munei and Galaty 1999; Campbell 1993; Rutten 1992; Markakis
1999; Okoth-Ogendo 2000). Land law and legal procedures in Kenya
have been misused by the well-placed to dispossess many poorer and
less well-connected Maasai (Galaty 1999; Munei and Galaty 1999).
Instances of manipulation of land-titling procedures, and in some cases
corrupt and illegal practice, have been widely documented (Galaty
1994, 1999; Munei and Galaty 1999; Thompson and Homewood
2002) and have become established in what can be seen as a systematic
process of accumulation of land and wealth by a circumscribed ‘elite’.
Land privatisation has had a serious impact on Maasai communities,
with much land being progressively taken over by other groups and
many Maasai eventually losing rights of access (Galaty 1999; Munei
and Galaty 1999). ‘One would expect . . . that titling Maasai land would
have reduced uncertainty of tenure and social conflict, but in fact,
instances of uncertainty and conflict have risen’ (Munei and Galaty
1999: 68). The implications are particularly serious for women and
other dependents not qualifying for registration and land title in the
first instance (Talle 1988).
Formerly common land in Kenya Maasailand is now mostly privatised
and much is currently undergoing rapid exclosure and/or conversion to
cultivation (Campbell 1993; Galaty 1994; Homewood et al. 2001).
Simultaneously, in-migration of non-Maasai into these areas has
occurred. Between 1962 and 1989 the percentage of population
represented by Maasai had declined from 79% to 47% in Narok
District (Coast 2000), and from 78% to 57% in Kajiado (Rutten 1992).
‘The net result of this influx of migrants, along with the irregular land
1 In our study area, Lemek group ranch has had one change of group ranch committee
members in twenty-five years, Koiyaki one change in twenty years, and Siana two changes in
twenty years (Thompson 2002).
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allocations, was to intensify a sense of land pressure and insecurity on
the part of the largely pastoralist Maasai’ (Klopp 2001: 508).
During the 1990s in Kenya Maasailand, conflicts over land and
associated agricultural or wildlife revenues have repeatedly erupted
in violent confrontations (Klopp 2001; Dietz 1996; Thompson and
Homewood 2002). Hundreds died,2 and tens or even hundreds
of thousands were displaced (Klopp 2001). While one widespread
perception sees this violent conflict as a reaction to in-migration
creating and exacerbating land shortages (Galaty 1999), there is
considerable evidence to suggest that much of this violence was
deliberately orchestrated to undermine multiparty elections and allow
leading politicians to retain a monopoly on power (Klopp 2001, 2002;
Dietz 1996; cf. Fratkin 2001). In North Narok these conflicts may
have been primarily attributable to political manipulation for electoral
purposes, though they built on existing tensions (e.g. Galaty 1999).
The conflicts by no means followed simple ethnic lines (Klopp 2002).
There was a strong political and economic dimension: violence was
primarily targeted at multi-ethnic communities of smallholders, and
benefited large landowners and supporters of the regime of the then
president of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi. Throughout Narok, violence hit
Kikuyu and Kipsigis smallholders, while non-Maasai land barons were
not affected: class and political clientage, rather than ethnicity, were
the real determinants (Klopp 2001). Major tensions erupted among
the Maasai, with ‘the unthinkable: physical conflict between those in
the privileged relation of age-set sponsorship, and cursing of elders by
juniors’ (Galaty 1994: 112).
Tanzania Maasailand
The Maasai have inhabited northern Tanzania since the seventeenth
century, when they displaced the Datoga from the Highlands of Ngoron-
goro. The wars and pandemics of the end of the nineteenth century
devastated Tanzania Maasailand (Waller 1979; Spear 1997). The Ger-
mans established a Maasai reserve south of the Moshi–Arusha–Dodoma
road, intending to free up the northern Monduli-Ngorongoro-Loliondo-
Longido areas for settlers. Following the First World War and the
British colonial takeover, the 1923 Crown Land Ordinance placed
all land under the control of the Governor. The government thus
became ‘simultaneously trustee and conqueror’ (Igoe and Brockington
1999) controlling rights of occupancy, whether ‘deemed’ (customary) or
‘granted’ (newly allocated). The British administration also established
Maasai reserves, and by 1926 the Masai District covered most of then
Tanganyika Maasailand, with some chunks excised for settler use. Local
people’s customary rights were largely protected as ‘deemed rights of
occupancy’. However, after the Second World War the colonial admin-
istration increasingly took land from local users to grant to settlers and to
2 By some counts, thousands lost their lives (see Klopp 2001).
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gazette conservation areas, e.g. Mkomazi Game Reserve (Brockington
2002), and Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation Area
(Homewood and Rodgers 1991; Shivji and Kapinga 1998). Nyerere’s
vision of a united nation in which every citizen would be Tanzanian,
rather than a member of a tribe, led to a post-Independence policy with
citizens having the right to live anywhere in Tanzania. This erased the
ethnic dimension of access to land and foreshadowed the extinction of
customary rights (Ndagala 1994). The post-Independence state granted
extensive areas for parastatal farms, ranches and protected areas, over-
riding customary rights of former users in the process. Perhaps the
most drastic was the granting of a cumulative total of 100,000 hectares
of best Barabaig pasture land for a Canadian-funded wheat scheme,
without consultation of or compensation to the agro-pastoralists whose
livelihoods it had hitherto underpinned (Lane 1994, 1996a, 1996b;
Ndagala 1990b).
During the 1970s, a major USAID-funded programme (Maasai
Range and Livestock Development Project [MRLDP]) sought to
establish and develop Ranching Associations (RA) throughout Tanzania
Maasailand (Ndagala 1990b; Moris 1981). This process would have
given security of tenure to resident pastoral and agro-pastoral people,
but it ran counter to principles enshrined in the wider national
programme of villagisation (ujamaa) then underway. By the end of
the decade, the MRLDP had collapsed (Moris 1981; Homewood and
Rodgers 1991) and Maasai areas were brought under the villagisation
programme (Ndagala 1982). In principle, ujamaa villages would have
their land demarcated and registered by District Development Councils,
and Village Councils would then allocate land on which households
could farm and build. In theory, land was available for every rural
person’s livelihood needs, although not for individual disposal. In
practice, villagisation wrought havoc on rural land tenure, and left
matters wide open for conflict, dislocation and land expropriation (Shivji
1998). Registration of village grazing lands, in an attempt to improve
security of tenure, often led to fierce conflict between neighbouring
villages, for example between overlapping Maasai and Sonjo users in
Loliondo (ibid.).
From the mid-80s, with economic liberalisation and pressure from
international financial organisations, such tenure changes increasingly
benefited expatriate individuals and corporations, many involved in
export cash crops (Igoe and Brockington 1999). The promotion
of foreign investment has repeatedly led to alienation of village
land to investors, under the guise of supposedly ‘joint’ ventures for
tourism, mining, ranching or cash crops. Privatisation of land originally
allocated to parastatals, and the upsurge in real estate development
and speculation, have provided rich opportunities for further alienation
to outsiders (Shivji 1998). Conservation legislation has increasingly
constrained natural resource use by rural populations (Igoe and
Brockington 1999). Since the mid-1980s, the rural poor have found
themselves squeezed between alienation to large-scale state enterprises
(whether cultivation or conservation) and foreign investors on the one
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hand, and the return of lands to former local landowners on the other
(Shivji 1998).
The Presidential Land Commission (1991–1992) undertook a
comprehensive survey of land tenure issues in rural Tanzania,
and its landmark Report (Tanzania 1994a, 1994b) set out both
the detail of individual cases and overarching, radical analyses.
It documented processes of expropriation and allocation, whether
illegal, unconstitutional, or the product of confused and contradictory
legislation, that have become common in Tanzania. The Regulation
of Land Tenure Act of 1992 deliberately pre-empted the Presidential
Commission’s findings and, in the face of mounting instability, sought
to extinguish all customary rights, further deepening the ‘utter confusion
in the legal framework of village land tenure’ (Shivji 1998: 16).
Unlike Kenya, the ethnicity criterion underlying colonial and
subsequent land allocation was superseded, with Nyerere’s ‘one nation’
policy entitling citizens to apply to live anywhere in Tanzania. As in
Kenya, the land law and legal processes which should protect the
rights of customary users have repeatedly been bypassed, manipulated
or reinterpreted in ways that have allowed individuals and groups
in gatekeeper positions to sell or lease formerly communal land to
national and foreign investors. Court challenges and rulings have been
ignored. Conflicts over land and associated agricultural or wildlife
revenues in Maasailand have started to lead to violent confrontations
and have elicited repressive measures (Brockington 1999; Brockington
and Homewood 1999; Lane 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; MNRT 1997; Shivji
1998; Shivji and Kapinga 1998; Otieno 2002a, 2002b).
CONFLICT: IN-MIGRATION, ETHNICITY AND RESOURCE ACCESS
Analyses of conflict in developing countries tend to focus on
either contributing factors (Stewart 2002) or issues of scale and
intensity (Hussein 1998). Violent conflict can result from ethnic or
economic divides, environmental hot spots of resource concentration
or deterioration, and/or failures of the social contract providing
human or constitutional rights between state and subjects (Stewart
2002). Analyses of the scale and intensity of violent conflict concern
frequency (in terms of numbers of separate incidents), intensity (in
terms of numbers of casualties), and their scale (individual violent
confrontations; instances of state violence against groups within national
borders; political and military conflict between groups within or across
national borders) (Hussein 1998). In East African rangelands, violent
conflicts around power and control of land or natural resources have
escalated to outright civil war in Uganda. The relative stability of
Kenya and Tanzania since Independence has been explained as the
result of relative equality of opportunity, whether political (Tanzania)
or economic (Kenya) (Klugman et al. 1999).
However, other literature looking beneath and beyond the level
of nation states has detailed increasing conflicts between farmers and
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herders. It has also noted widespread marginalisation of pastoral peoples
in Maasailand, and East Africa, and more generally across sub-Saharan
Africa (Galaty and Bonte 1992; IIED 1992–1999; Igoe and Brockington
1999; Markakis 1999; Fratkin 2001). Pastoralist peoples such as
the Maasai have been divided by colonially determined boundaries
(Galaty and Bonte 1992), making them minorities in the nations
they inhabit. Internal administrative boundaries within nations further
fragment already minority pastoralist peoples (e.g. Ndagala 1990a,
1990b). Caught in conflicts of interest whether within or between
nations, pastoralist peoples have in many cases become the victims
of state neglect, or even the targets of state violence. Social services,
physical infrastructure, and political representation are routinely well
below national averages in remote and low population density pastoral
areas (Coast 2000). Where social services are provided, they may be
preferentially accessed by more settled, non-pastoralist in-migrants to
formerly pastoralist-dominated areas (for Tanzania Maasailand, see
Moris 1981; Ole Kuney 1994; for Kenya, see Rutten 1992). Tensions
over access to land and the concomitant intensifying competition for
key resources, whether through population growth or the political
economy of resource distribution, have meant even the apparently
stable nation states of Kenya and Tanzania harbour considerable
tensions and conflict issues around pastoralists. Mobility and migration
are commonly high, and the associated complexities of perennially
renegotiating temporary and flexible access to resources are made more
problematic in a landscape that is progressively more rigidly surveyed,
demarcated and allocated. These tensions may be expressed through
silent discrimination and silent violence (Hussein 1998; cf. Hitchcock
1996), while recently demarcated boundaries are reinforced with fences
and in some cases force. Throughout the 1990s there have been cases
where state agencies, coerce, evict and exclude pastoralists from their
customary rangelands. In some cases this is with outsider backing for
conservation or development ends (Peluso 1998; Brockington 2002;
Shivji and Kapinga 1998: Igoe and Brockington 1999; Brockington
and Homewood 1999; Chatty and Colchester 2002), for development
projects (Lane 1996b, 1998) while in other cases this has occurred
simply in the course of violent power seeking (James 1996; Hutchinson
1996; Dietz 1996; Klopp 2001).
There are few data allowing evaluation of the degree to which
violent conflict involving pastoralists may have increased and may still
be increasing in sub-Saharan Africa (Hussein 1998). Herder–farmer
relations continue to shift between cooperation, competition and
conflict as they have done for millennia. Individual violent disputes
involving theft, raiding fights and even killings are probably often
overlooked in the national and international press. State violence may
often be presented—and internationally perceived—as enforcement
against poachers, trespassers or other outlaws. In reality, however,
it may represent state action supporting politically dominant resource
users against others, and result in mass eviction and forced displacement
that destroys livelihoods on potentially enormous scales (Lane 1996a,
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1998; Peluso 1998; Brockington, 2002). In cases across sub-Saharan
Africa (and wider than in our Maasailand study areas), political violence
using military action to subjugate populations and control resources has
been the most violent and destructive form of conflict, affecting many
pastoralist populations in the present day, and involving raiding of
livestock and destruction of villages. Over the last century the nature
and impacts of conflict have changed. In particular, the introduction of
modern weaponry has changed the stakes. The acquisition of modern
weapons can give a lethal advantage to one group, as in contemporary
northern Uganda (see Mirzeler and Young 2000). This may have
happened on occasion in the past (e.g. nineteenth-century Datoga in
Tanzania and Laikipiak Maasai in Kenya), but where there was once
at least the theoretical possibility of balanced and reciprocal raiding
between groups, total victory or at least heavy casualties have become
common possibilities (Turton 1996; Kurimoto and Simonse 1998).
Lethal synergies may develop between geopolitical conflicts and local
rivalries (Allen 1996; Fukui and Markakis 1994; Markakis 1993; Hogg
1997; Galaty and Bonte 1992). Across Africa, pastoralist groups have
been disproportionately drawn into such conflicts, in part because of
the colonial legacy of boundaries which left them fragmented between
mutually hostile neighbouring nations, and cast as subversive minorities
within whichever nation they find themselves (Markakis 1993; Galaty
and Bonte 1992).
Kenya and Tanzania Maasailand have mainly experienced conflicts
of interest, competition over natural resources, and periodic individual
or state/group violence. These conflicts have not escalated to the point
of extreme political and military violence seen in Uganda, northern
Kenya and the Horn of Africa. However, both individual-level violent
confrontations, and ongoing low levels of violence on the part of the state
and politically dominant groups are widespread, as is the perception
that such conflicts are created or fuelled by in-migration. This paper
presents detailed household-level data and analysis of in-migration,
resource access and exclusion in East African rangelands. It focuses on
the extent to which access to land and other assets are structured by
residence status, ethnicity, and economic/political status.
STUDY AREAS
The research presented here focuses on the protected area-adjacent
zones around the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem (SME) straddling the
Tanzania/Kenya border. These rangelands are characterised by strong
ecological, ethnic and socio-economic continuities, across which
contrasting political and economic contexts have been superimposed
(Homewood et al. 2001). The SME illustrates processes common to
many savannah protected area-adjacent zones elsewhere in sub-Saharan
Africa. The contrasts between Kenyan and Tanzanian lands offer a
controlled comparison, with related issues and factors operating in
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essentially similar ecological, ethnic and socio-economic circumstances,
but radically different macro-economic and political contexts (ibid.).3
The SME consists of the contiguous core conservation areas of the
Maasai Mara National Reserve (MMNR), Kenya, and the Serengeti
National Park (SNP), Tanzania, surrounded by buffer zones that
make up the ecologically continuous wet-season wildlife dispersal areas
and migration routes (see FIGURE 1). Earlier work has characterised
demography, land use and livelihoods within the protected area-adjacent
zones to the north, east and south of SME, which are populated
primarily by Maasai agro-pastoralists (group ranches of Narok and
Kajiado Districts in Kenya; Loliondo Game Controlled Area and
Ngorongoro Conservation Area [NCA] in Tanzania). In the present
study, additional foci of in-migration familiar from this previous research
were chosen as study sites (Coast 2000; Thompson 2002). In Kenya,
in-migration research focused on Sikrar (Lemek Group Ranch, Narok
District) and Emarti (Trans Mara District) but also draws on previous
work in Lemek, Siana and Koiyaki Group Ranches (Thompson 2002;
Coast 2000). In Tanzania, research focused on Endulen in the NCA,
both the administrative and trading centre (madukani) and its rural
environs, drawing on comparative work in other areas of the NCA
and Loliondo (Coast 2000; Homewood et al. 2001). Maasai make
up most of the protected area-adjacent population to the north, east
and south of SME. For example, a census of the NCA population
(n=51,621 individuals) reported that 97% were Maasai (NCAA 1999).
In Endulen, Sikrar and Emarti sites, the balance of ethnicity has
been significantly altered by in-migration, primarily of Kipsigis (Kenya)
and Iraqw/Mbulu (Tanzania). The nature and implications of current
in-migration can only be understood in context, and the following
sections sketch historical and contemporary processes within the main
study sites.
Kenya
Primary data for this study are presented from two sites, Emarti and
Sikrar. Emarti centre lies on the western edge of the MMNR and
has two government primary schools and water piped from the Mara
River. Sikrar is located on Lemek group ranch and is furthest of all
Kenyan sites from MMNR. It has a primary and secondary school, and
unimproved piped water. Comparative data are drawn from previous
research in sites on Siana, Koiyaki and Lemek Group Ranches, whose
small trading centres each provide primary schools (and in Lemek, a
secondary school), dispensaries, and where there has been little or no
in-migration by non-Maasai. These sites are dominated by livestock
production and cultivation, with varying degrees of involvement in
tourism. For example Talek, on Koiyaki Group Ranch, has grown up
around an MMNR entrance gate, and residents do not farm but are
3 See below for site-specific circumstances limiting this generalisation.
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1.  Endulen *
3.  Loliondo †
5.  Emarti *
2.  Highlands Forest Reserve †
4. Talek †
6.  Sikrar *
* study site  † site of comparative data source
FIGURE 1 The Tanzania/Kenya border showing the Serengeti-Mara ecosys-
tem and adjacent areas
commonly involved in tourism-related as well as livestock activities.
By contrast Nkorinkori on Lemek is in the centre of the mechanised
wheat belt, with no tourist involvement but exceptional opportunities
for mechanised farming and land leasing.
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Tanzania
The study focuses on the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) which
has been managed as a joint land-use area for wildlife conservation
and pastoralism for the last forty years (Homewood and Rodgers 1991;
Thompson 1997). This site is governed by conservation priorities
presenting a unique and difficult set of rules and obstacles that do not
pertain to Maasai in other areas of Tanzania. This does not undermine
our overall analysis and comparison, but limits the extent to which we
can generalise to the rest of Tanzania from this particular study site.
Village grazing is demarcated within otherwise parastatal-controlled
lands (Homewood 1995) allowing few rights over resource tenure
and access for local users (Shivji and Kapinga 1998). Ngorongoro’s
complex history of in-migration, driven by climatic fluctuations, security
(periodic raiding and violence with Barabaig and Sukuma) and, over
the last forty years, the alternation of development opportunities with
periods of imposed restriction, is set out in a later section. The main
study sites were in the rapidly growing trading centre of Endulen village,
and in its rural environs. Comparative data are drawn from previous
work in other areas of the NCA (Coast 2000), and from adjacent
Loliondo and Longido (Homewood 2000; Homewood et al. 2001).
Endulen centre (hereafter madukani) dates back to the 1950s
when the colonial district officer was based in the village. It has
undergone a recent rapid rise in the speed of in-migration, making
it the largest and densest settlement of all the study sites. Services
include commerce,4 education,5 health,6 administration,7 and security.8
While Maasai lifetime residents populate the rural environs of Endulen,
madukani draws in-migrant professionals to work in either government
or Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA) positions.
Increasingly they retire there and develop business interests. At the
other end of the socio-economic scale in Endulenmadukani, a significant
proportion of households are in-migrant farm labourers, some of whom
work in return for food and shelter, and are commonly referred to as
kibarua.
METHODS
Detailed data relating to mobile and in-migrant populations are often
poorly served by national demographic data collection exercises such
as censuses, not least because of the difficulties involved in defining
‘migration’ and ‘migrants’. Migration is widely acknowledged to be the
4 Shops, beer houses, butcheries, maize grinding mills, etc.
5 This role expanded recently, with the opening of a government secondary school in
April 2001.
6 It is estimated that up to one-third of patients at Endulen Hospital travel more than 60
km to use its services.
7 NCAA zonal headquarters
8 Police post and NCAA Game Ranger post
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most difficult component of the demographic balancing equation to
conceptualise, measure and analyse (e.g. Anarfi 1998).
In both countries, migration issues are highly sensitive; the cur-
rent study was only possible because of previous long-term researcher
field presence (Coast 2000, 2002; Thompson 2002). Both qualitative
and quantitative methods were used, focusing mainly at the indi-
vidual and household level. In both countries a Participatory Rapid
Appraisal (PRA) style pilot study, based on past research experience
and complemented by participant observation, semi-structured inter-
views and oral histories, formed the basis for a single-round household
survey (Tanzania: n=90 households; Kenya: n=157 households). The
questionnaire-based survey included a wide range of issues: house-
hold composition; duration of residence; dependence on cultivation,
livestock and other income-generating activities; and land acquisi-
tion, leasing and sale. The comparative data are drawn from previous
work comprising a multi-round survey of 288 households in Koiyaki,
Lemek and Siana (Thompson 2002) and 505 households interviewed
in Ngorongoro (Coast 2000) as well as 174 households interviewed in
Ngorongoro and Loliondo of which thirty were re-visited in a multi-
round survey.
As far as possible the same methods were used for the in-migrant
survey in Kenya and Tanzania, but circumstances limit comparability.
For example, post-Independence Tanzanian censuses do not record
ethnicity, and analyses focusing on ethnic correlates of development
or economic status are considered politically sensitive and potentially
destabilising. In Kenya, by contrast, data on ethnicity are routinely
collected in decennial censuses. In the present study ethnic affiliation
was taken as the individual’s mother tongue. Respondents may
misreport ethnic group, especially if they are concerned that their
rights might be affected. However, the use of lifetime residents as
interviewers minimised misreporting. In-migration was defined as a
shift of permanent residence to the study site. For all study sites, ‘long-
term resident’ is defined by a household head who moved to the area
prior to the 1970s. All households that moved to the study site after
1970 are referred to as ‘recent in-migrant’. These definitions are used
throughout the paper.
RESULTS
Two sets of results are presented here. Firstly, a description of the
nature and scale of in-migration, including historical trends and ethnic
composition of in-migrants. Secondly, resource access is outlined with
respect to ethnicity and migration status, with specific reference to
access to land. Within each of these sections, comparative data are
presented for both Kenya and Tanzania, and results are placed in the
context of other work.
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NATURE AND SCALE OF IN-MIGRATON
Based on oral histories and survey data, there are few in-migrant
households9 in Lemek, Siana and Koiyaki sites in Kenya, or in the rural
Endulen environs in Tanzania.
Kenya
Settlement and land use in Western Narok and the adjacent parts of
Trans-Mara District were shaped by the interaction of the Maasai moves
with climate, vegetation, land use, conflict and disease (Waller 1990;
Lamprey and Waller 1990). Maasai spread into Western Narok between
1903 and 1913, while further south other Maasai dominated the Loita
Hills, the southern part of Trans-Mara and northern Tanganyika. In the
first decades of the twentieth century, the plains of Western Narok were
used only seasonally, with Lemek, a site of permanent water, emerging
as a centre of settlement, trade and livestock facilities (Waller 1990).
Colonial survey reports show there was still no permanent settlement
anywhere west of Lemek by 1946 (ibid.). From the mid-1950s onwards
the colonial administration encouraged tsetse control, bush clearance
and controlled grazing, halting the spread of tsetse by 1960.
Oral histories (Thompson 2002) dovetail with historical and aerial
photo analyses (Lamprey and Waller 1990; Waller 1990) to give a
picture of Sikrar and Emarti as two ‘frontier’ sites, with different timing
of in-migration. Our survey showed that 75% of Sikrar and 56% of
Emarti sample household heads had arrived in the Western Narok
study sites since 1960, and 53% and 37% respectively since 1970 (see
TABLE 1).
TABLE 1 Percentage distribution of decade of
arrival of household heads: Kenya
Sikrar
(n = 94)
Emarti
(n = 59)
pre-1960s 25 44
1960s 22 19
1970s 13 29
1980s 15 5
1990s 25 3
The earliest household arrivals (from 1938) were recorded for Emarti,
an area designated as Maasai by the colonial administration and
resettled in the wake of tsetse control. However, Emarti was still
largely uninhabited in the late 1950s, allowing relatively free access
9 Less than 0.02% of the study population in Kenya (Thompson and Homewood 2002;
Coast 2000).
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when in-migrants sought leave from the Maasai administrative chief
to clear and cultivate land west of the Mara plains. These in-migrants
were mainly Kipsigis, driven by land shortages in the then Kipsigis
Reserve to the north to seek cultivable land in Maasai ‘closed’ areas
(Manners 1967). Maasai of the Uas Nkishu Section followed, their
cattle benefiting from the cleared land (see Anderson 2002, for the
factors precipitating their removal from the Uas Nkishu Reserve). From
the late 1960s, private land was allocated on the western side of Lemek
to the emerging Maasai elite (cf. Galaty 1999; Munei and Galaty 1999),
and then sold on to in-migrant Kipsigis. Maasai settlements spread out
through the rest of Western Narok during the 1970s (Lamprey and
Waller 1990). In 1980–84, when Emarti lands were being subdivided,
Uas Nkishu Maasai families already in place called on others of their
section to move to the Emarti area. This strategic move triggered a new
influx, raising Maasai numbers in the ongoing contest with Kipsigis in-
migrants. Both Maasai and Kipsigis families gained registration as group
ranch members during this time, their petitions generally mediated by
gifts of livestock to the lands committee.
Before Lemek group ranch was established in 1969, influential local
Maasai (administration chiefs and other figures) applied successfully
to central government for title deeds, ostensibly to guard against the
continued westward movement of non-Maasai cultivating groups onto
Maasai lands. Many of these new landowners rapidly sold land on a
piece-meal basis to Kipsigis in-migrants (Thompson and Homewood
2002). Further opportunities for in-migration into Sikrar arose when
Lemek Group Ranch was established. By the 1990s therefore, many
Kipsigis families had been cultivating land in the area for over thirty
years. At the time of registering group ranch membership, prior to the
issue of title deeds in 1993–1999, many Kipsigis families were able to
have their names included (though excluded from the committee itself),
generally on the production of a gift to the group ranch lands committee.
These different histories are reflected in the differential association
of ethnicity with duration of residence for the two sites. In Sikrar,
the majority of long-term residents interviewed were Kipsigis while
the majority of recent in-migrants were Maasai. By contrast, over one
third of the whole sample in Emarti were long-term resident Maasai.
TABLE 2 Percentage distribution of household head by ethnicity and residence
status: Kenya
Sikrar
(n = 94)
Emarti
(n = 59)
long-term
resident
(pre-1970)
recent
in-migrant
(post-1970)
long-term
resident
recent
in-migrant
Maasai 3 22 35 17
Kipsigis 45 30 23 25
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The extent to which these differences are reflected in patterns of land
allocation is explored in a later section.
By no means all Kipsigis applicants who tried to establish or maintain
residence in these two areas were successful. It was reported that other
Kipsigis families who had arrived more recently left again, fleeing to
adjacent Bomet District during the politically driven and violent ‘ethnic
clashes’. These took place during the 1980s in Emarti (reportedly linked
to the land titling procedure), and in 1992 and 1997 in Sikrar (linked
to land-titling and multiparty elections) (Klopp 2001, 2002). As a
result of these clashes in both Sikrar and Emarti, Kipsigis and Maasai
communities today form separate clusters, with the Kipsigis located to
the west of each study site, placing them closer to the predominantly
Kipsigis Bomet District.
Tanzania
The NCA has a complex history of settlement, with Maasai moving there
from the Serengeti in 1959 as part of an agreement whereby the colonial
authorities removed Maasai from the newly established Serengeti
National Park, and created Ngorongoro as a Conservation Area with
a dual wildlife conservation and residence/community development
mandate, a unique situation in Tanzania. The Serengeti Maasai
were promised water development and other benefits at Ngorongoro,
most of which either proved short-lived or failed to materialise. The
initial advisory board set up at the time included several Maasai
representatives, rapidly reduced to one, and, from 1975, to none. There
were major influxes of in-migrants in the mid 1970s when the NCA
was—briefly and unsuccessfully—scheduled for Ranching Association
status (Moris 1981; Ndagala 1990b; Homewood and Rodgers 1991;
Perkin 1997) and again during periods when cultivation was relatively
freely allowed. These periods were interspersed with the imposition of
severe restrictions including eviction from the Crater, exclusion from the
Northern Highlands Forest Reserve, Olduvai and Olmoti, and periods
of harassment over established cultivation (Makacha and Ole Sayalel
1987; Shivji and Kapinga 1998). The NCAA considers cultivation to
conflict with conservation. There are perennial threats to ban cultivation
and to evict both non-Maasai and Maasai in-migrants and potentially
even long-term residents from the NCA. For example, in October 2001
the Conservator of NCA announced a new policy to evict all individuals
who have moved into the NCA since 1959. The extent to which this
may apply in practice, in particular to non-Maasai, ex-government
in-migrants and their families, is not yet clear. Reports in April 2002
suggested several in-migrant labourers had been arrested and given
lengthy jail sentences (Jonas Olsen, personal communication) though
their employers had not been penalised. In-migrants to the NCA have
included Maasai seeking drought refuge grazing and, during putative
Ranching Association status years, better veterinary and other livestock
support provision. At other times in-migrants have included non-
Maasai, both poor Iraqw and Mbulu labourers looking for farmwork
(kibarua), and also relatively well-off Chagga and Mbulu tradesmen,
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government retirees and their relations, looking for opportunities to
farm fertile land, establish businesses and take advantage of school and
other social services.
Endulen rural environs are more representative of conditions
elsewhere within the NCA, with few (6%) in-migrants since 1970, and
an entirely Maasai population (Coast 2000). In contrast, in-migration
to madukani fluctuated prior to 1980 (A˚rhem 1985) but has increased
rapidly since then, with over one-third of current household heads
arriving post-1990 (see TABLE 3). This reflects the recent blossoming
of service and economic opportunities for the well-placed in an era
of economic liberalisation, in a rapidly expanding settlement servicing
Tanzania’s highest-earning game-viewing area.
TABLE 3 Percentage distribution of
decade of arrival for in-migrant
households: madukani, Tanzania
Decade of
arrival Percentage
Pre-1970s 38
1970s 8
1980s 16
1990s 38
Not surprisingly for a growing trading centre, two-thirds of respon-
dent household heads report themselves as in-migrant, and three-
quarters of lifetime residents were born of in-migrant parents. In
Endulen madukani, two-thirds of recent in-migrants were non-Maasai,
predominantly Iraqw, originating from neighbouring Karatu and Mbulu
(see TABLE 4).
TABLE 4 Percentage distribution of household
head by ethnicity and resident status: madukani,
Tanzania
Long-term
resident
pre-1970
Recent
in-migrant
post-1970
Maasai 23 20
Iraqw 8 19
Chagga 0 7
other Tanzanian 8 14
Kenyan 0 1
584 EAST AFRICAN RANGELANDS
RESOURCE ACCESS AND EXCLUSION
Where analyses of access to the means of production have in the past
focused on land, labour and capital, a sustainable livelihoods framework
(defined by Carney and Farington 1998) extends and restructures
these factors in terms of the natural, physical, social, human and
financial dimensions of capital. Detailed expositions can be found
elsewhere (e.g. Ellis 2000) but for the purposes of the present paper
natural capital is represented primarily by land for cultivation, grazing,
wood poles and fuel it can provide. Physical capital is represented
by roads, waterpoints and other infrastructural developments. Social
capital comprises the network of social relations on which households
can draw to gain access. Maasai customary entitlements are structured
by the framework of section, location, clan, and age set, alongside more
recent but powerful factors such as relation to local leaders. Human
capital is represented by access to education and health services. Finally,
financial capital in the context of the rural populations in East African
rangelands is perhaps best measured by holdings of livestock and/or
land, and level of employment. Types of employment may be classed
as secure (often government) jobs, which are generally skilled and often
with business connections; intermediate types comprise reliable though
poorly paid non-farm jobs; the poorest options involve sporadic, casual
and unskilled employment (cf. Iliya and Swindell 1997).
The present study therefore uses empirical data to examine natural,
social and financial dimensions of livelihoods. Firstly, we examine access
to land for a variety of purposes, including cultivation, livestock grazing
and as an investment through the ownership and rental of property.
Secondly, broad patterns of access to and engagement with different
livelihoods are summarised (detailed data on education and livelihoods
form the basis of a separate companion paper). Finally, socio-political
networks and their role in exclusion and conflict are analysed here
from policy documents, press reports, key informants and observation
of individual cases. This paper does not deal with differential access to
either physical or human capital, either with respect to national averages
or other regions.
Access to land
East African rangelands are undergoing a widespread shift from
primarily communal tenure of common property resources to largely
privatised holdings (Toulmin and Quan 2000). There are both
similarities and contrasts between the trajectories of land alienation
for Kenya and Tanzania Maasailand (Homewood 1995). There are
striking differences in the way land alienation is patterned with respect
to in-migration and ethnicity, though trajectories in both countries
are readily explained by what Klopp (2001: 509) calls ‘class’ (socio-
economic status and concomitant power and wealth). Though the
Ngorongoro Conservation Area represents a rather special situation
within Tanzania, it broadly reflects trends elsewhere in Tanzanian
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Maasailand (cf. Igoe and Brockington 1999), and supports the wider
Kenya/Tanzania comparison.
Kenya
Maasai households in both Sikrar and Emarti report significantly
(p < 0.0005) higher landholdings received at subdivision than Kipsigis
(see FIGURE 2; Thompson and Homewood 2002). In Emarti, well-
connected Maasai received large land allocations (more than 40
hectares) at subdivision, while poor Maasai and Kipsigis received
smaller areas (between 1 and 8 hectares). Half of all Emarti Maasai
received more than 20 hectares. By comparison, half all Emarti Kipsigis
received up to 4 hectares, and 42% received none at all. In Sikrar, over
80% of Maasai received more than 40 hectares on subdivision while
80% of Kipsigis received 10 hectares or less.
FIGURE 2 Mean land received at subdivision, by ethnicity and location
In the Kenyan study sites, differences in land entitlement by ethnicity
are greatest early on in the land allocation process (see TABLE 5). During
the 1960s, Maasai individuals resident in the area and connected to the
administration were able to register title to large areas of land at Lemek
Group ranch (covering Sikrar, Lemek Centre and Nkorinkori).10 Life
histories of Kipsigis and Maasai moving to the area from the 1950s
onwards show how in-migrants were initially given permission to settle
by Maasai administrators, and that by the 1960s these influential Maasai
were leasing land to in-migrants. Subsequently, Lemek group ranch was
subdivided; a process lasting from survey in 1995 to final allocation of
10 It was not possible to interview these large landholders. They declined to participate in
interviews because of their positions as local MP, administrative chief or councillor.
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title deeds in 1999. During this land registration process, land allocation
favoured Maasai over Kipsigis in Emarti.
The following three case studies, based on detailed life histories,
illustrate the key points outlined in TABLE 5 and demonstrate how
ethnicity and migrant status have influenced land entitlements.
Case study 1: land allocation to Maasai ‘big’ men in Kenya
During the 1950s the colonial government operated a veterinary research
station and cattle-holding pens on what later became Lemek group ranch.
These stations were issued with title deeds held by the government.
At Independence, Maasai petitioned the Lands Office in Nairobi to
transfer the title deeds to themselves. Powerful traditional leaders, including
administrative chiefs recognised by the colonial administration, were able
to use their influence and have the title deeds allocated to themselves.
For example, the paramount chief of the area went on to become an
extremely respected and influential leader in the newly formed independent
government, and received large land transfers at both locations. His
subsequent accumulation of wealth can be judged from his obituary in
the national press, listing ten wives and sixty-three children, several of whom
hold positions of prominence as Members of Parliament, officials of the
County Council and so on. He had shares in at least three tourist lodges,
owning the land on which one was built, as well as large mechanised wheat
and livestock holdings. [Interview Book 2, p. 65; Interview Book 1, p. 68;
Thompson 2002; Daily Nation 10 April 2000]
Case study 2: land allocation to a long-term Kipsigis resident (poor man) and a
recent in-migrant Maasai at Sikrar (rich man)
A Kipsigis man, X, arrived at Sikrar in 1969. The chief in Mulot (a Kipsigis
area) brokered the original occupation of the land with the paramount chief
of the Maasai Area. The paramount chief mandated the subdivision of an
area of land amongst Kipsigis who had contributed livestock. Under this
process, respondent X purchased 1 acre of land from the Maasai, costing
him two cows. Respondent X has eight years of primary school education,
and works as a driver. On subdivision of the group ranch some thirty years
later he was allocated a further 4 acres. He owns four cattle (including three
milch cows) and a total of seven sheep and goats. He cultivates the 4 acres
in Sikrar but has had no harvest since 1997 due to drought.
In contrast, a Maasai man, Y, moved to Sikrar in 1996. A registered
member of Lemek Group ranch, Y received 120 acres of land. He has a
cattle herd of seventy animals including sixteen milch cows, and owns at
least 150 sheep and goats. He cultivates 5 acres, although no harvest was
obtained from 1998 onwards owing to drought. Maize from his last harvest
in 1997 totalled 30 bags and lasted the family the entire year. He still rents
out 40 acres of land each year in smaller 2–3 acre plots to Kipsigis farmers,
at a rate of Kshs 1,200 (US$20) per acre. His wife runs a small shop at a
nearby trading centre. [Interview Book 1, p. 147, 24 February 2001]
Case study 3: landless recent in-migrants (poor)
Z, a Kipsigis, moved to Emarti in 1983. His father had many sons and only a
small farm at Kapkoimur near Nandi, a Kipsigis area to the west of our study
area. Z sold his land (25 acres) and invested in two agents who convinced
him they would buy cheaper land for him in Eldoret. The agents cheated
him out of this money. Respondent Z moved to Emarti as the land had
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not at that stage been subdivided, hoping to be placed on the land register.
However, he did not succeed and now lives on Catholic church land at
Emarti. Respondent Z owns one milch cow, two sheep and two goats. He
does not cultivate. His wife works in the mission as a cook, and earns Kshs
500 (US$9) per month.
Building on the qualitative data above, we use regression analysis to
explore the relative importance of ethnicity, migrant status and (in
Model Two) wealth, in determining land received at subdivision (see
TABLE 6 and TABLE 7).
TABLE 6 shows the results of a multiple regression analysing land
areas received in Kenya as a function of two explanatory variables,
ethnicity and migrant status. TABLE 7 shows the same, with the
addition of a further explanatory variable in terms of the number
of livestock currently owned (a proxy measure of wealth status at
the time of land allocation). TABLES 6 and 7 thus represent statistical
models which show the relative importance of individual explanatory
variables (ethnicity, duration of residence, wealth) as well as their
combined ability to account for the variation observed in land allocated
at subdivision (the dependent variable). The main cells of the table show
the size of the partial regression coefficients or beta values. The beta
value indicates the proportion of the observed variation in allocated land
areas which is explained by a given variable. The final line of each table
shows the coefficient of determination, or the proportion of variation
in land areas allocated which is jointly explained by all the explanatory
variables acting together in the model. The number of asterisks shows
the degree of statistical significance attached to each component and/or
to the overall model.
TABLE 6 Model One: land received in Kenya as a function of ethnicity and migrant
status
Independent variables Both sites Sikrar Emarti
—Ethnicity −0.634*** −0.856*** −0.364**
—Migrant status −0.109 0.072 −0.351**
r2 0.658*** 0.787*** 0.292***
NOTE *** p < 0.0005
**p < 0.005
*p < 0.05
no asterisk = not statistically significant.
The table represents a statistical model which shows the relative individual and combined
importance of ethnicity and duration of residence in accounting for the variation observed
in land allocated at subdivision. The main cells of the table (beta values) indicate the
proportion of the observed variation in allocated land areas which can be explained by
the two factors (ethnicity and/or duration of residence) in one or both sites. The final line
of each table shows the proportion of variation in land areas allocated which is jointly
explained by both ethnicity and duration of residence acting together in the model. The
degree of statistical significance of each component’s contribution, and of the overall
model, in accounting for the observed variation in size of land holdings, is shown by the
number of asterisks.
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For both locations, the amount of variance explained by the model
increases between Model One and Model Two, with the introduction
of wealth in livestock equivalents as an independent variable. In Sikrar,
however, ethnicity still remains the single great contributor to the
variance in land received at subdivision (beta = −0.660, p < 0.0005).
The introduction of land received at subdivision in Model Two
increases the amount of explanation of variance in current livestock
ownership in both Sikrar and Emarti (from 50.6% to 60.4% and from
10.2% to 20.0% respectively) although it should be noted that the
model only reaches statistical significance in Sikrar (p < 0.0005). The
introduction of land received as an independent variable reduces both
the strength and the significance of ethnicity as a contributor to the
variance in livestock ownership.
Ethnicity emerges as the major determinant of land received
overall (beta = −0.634, p < 0.0005) and in Sikrar (beta = −0.856,
p < 0.0005). Ethnicity is also a strongly significant determinant at
Emarti, but here (where the main phase of land allocation began pre-
1970) migrant status is equally important and as strongly statistically
significant. Overall, ethnicity and migrant status alone account for
65.8% of the variance in the amount of land allocated, and for
78.7% of the variance at Sikrar (29.2% of the variance at Emarti).
In Emarti, the amount of land received by Maasai households at
subdivision differs significantly (p ≤ 0.005) between long-term residents
(mean = 20.4 ha) and recent in-migrants (mean = 3.7 ha). In Sikrar,
the relationship is not significant, although recent Maasai in-migrants
reported considerably greater land (mean = 46.9 ha) at subdivision
than long-term Maasai residents (mean = 20.1 ha)
In a second analysis (TABLE 7) we include a standardised wealth
measure based on livestock equivalents per reference adult. Subdivision
and allocation occurred at very different times in Sikrar (20–25 years
prior to the survey) and Emarti (3–5 years before the survey), and we
have no direct measure of wealth rank or socio-economic class at the
time of subdivision. Although some households will have experienced
major reversals of fortune, and current livestock holdings per reference
adult is inevitably an imperfect measure, this is still likely to be the
best predictor of wealth at an earlier period. Model Two is based
on the combination of ethnicity, migrant status and current livestock
holdings, and explains an even higher proportion of the variance in land
allocated, and is highly significant at p < 0.0005. The model accounts
for 82.9% of the variation at Sikrar, where ethnicity remains the main
determinant. At Emarti, all three factors are of comparable importance
and in combination they account for 39.1% of the variance in the
amount of land allocated.
Ethnicity emerges as the main and most consistent determinant of
access to land, with land received by Maasai at subdivision at Sikrar
some fourteen times greater than Kipsigis (Maasai = 43.6 ha, Kipsigis =
3.1 ha), and five times greater at Emarti (Maasai = 15.0 ha, Kipsigis =
3.2 ha). The mean amount of land received at subdivision by Kipsigis,
regardless of location, is remarkably similar. Our survey found no
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TABLE 7 Model Two: land received at subdivision in Kenya as a function of
ethnicity, migrant status and current livestock holdings
Independent variables Both sites Sikrar Emarti
—Ethnicity −0.390*** −0.660*** −0.310**
—Migrant status 0.010 0.045 −0.313**
—LE : RA 0.518*** 0.292*** 0.308**
r2 0.624*** 0.829*** 0.391***
NOTE ***p < 0.0005
**p < 0.005
*p < 0.05
no asterisk = not statistically significant.
The table represents a statistical model which shows the relative individual and combined
importance of ethnicity, duration of residence, and also wealth in livestock equivalents per
reference adult, in accounting for the variation observed in land allocated at subdivision.
The main cells of the table (beta values) indicate the proportion of the observed variation
in allocated land areas which can be explained by each of the three factors (ethnicity,
duration of residence, wealth in livestock equivalents/reference adult) in one or both
sites. The final line of each table shows the proportion of variation in land areas allocated
which is jointly explained by all three factors ethnicity, duration of residence and also
wealth in livestock equivalents per reference adult, all acting together in the model. The
degree of statistical significance of each component’s contribution, and of the overall
model, in accounting for the observed variation in size of land holdings, is shown by the
number of asterisks.
FIGURE 3 Mean livestock equivalent per reference adult, by ethnicity
and location
landless Maasai households, but 4% of Kipsigis households in Sikrar
and 7% in Emarti reported no access to land for cultivation.
Livestock ownership is also significantly (p ≤ 0.005) differentiated
by ethnicity, with markedly higher levels of ownership amongst Maasai
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households compared with Kipsigis in both Emarti and Sikrar (see
FIGURE 3). Recent in-migrants to Emarti have smaller land areas
and smaller livestock holdings than long-term residents, reflecting the
relative poverty of later arrivals in this area, whether Maasai or Kipsigis.
During the post-registration period, new land allocations have been
much smaller in size. Land is frequently acquired by purchase via market
dealings rather than involving new allocation. Again, transactions
involving Maasai are much larger than those involving Kipsigis (see
TABLE 8). Around one household in six in Sikrar and Emarti had
been involved in a recent land transaction. Despite the small numbers,
patterns of land transactions suggest that Maasai in Sikrar tend to be
involved in deals over major land areas, while Kipsigis are involved in
larger numbers of smaller deals.
TABLE 8 Land transfers reported 1996-2001 by ethnicity, Kenya (mean ± SD)
Sikrar Emarti
Kipsigis Maasai Kipsigis Maasai
ha purchased 1.3 ± 1.1 21.5 ± 26.9 0.12 1.2
(n = 6) (n = 2) (n = 1) (n = 1)
ha sold 1.2 ± 1.2 23.6 ± 18.0 3.6 ± 5.7 1.2
(n = 9) (n = 4) (n = 3) (n = 1)
The figures represent the mean numbers of hectares purchased (or sold) along with the
standard deviation, which gives a measure of the variability of the sample around that
average value. In each case the variability is high (standard deviation at least of the order
of the average transaction).
TABLE 9 Land transfers reported 1996-2001 by residence, Kenya (mean ± SD)
Sikrar Emarti
Long-term
resident
Recent
in-migrant
Long-term
resident
Recent
in-migrant
ha purchased 0.7 ± 0.9 9.7 ± 17.2 0.7 ± 0.8 −
(n = 3) (n = 5) (n = 2) (n = 0)
ha sold 0.8 ± 0.6 16.6 ± 17.7 0.6 ± 0.5 10.1
(n = 7) (n = 6) (n = 3) (n = 1)
The figures represent the mean numbers of hectares purchased (or sold) along with the
standard deviation, which gives a measure of the variability of the sample around that
average value. In each case the variability is high (standard deviation at least of the order
of the average transaction).
In both areas, long-term residents have similar low-level involvement
in land transactions. In Sikrar, but not Emarti, recent in-migrants are
more involved in large land transactions than are long-term residents
(see TABLE 9).
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Tanzania
Access to land in the NCA was governed in the past by customary
systems of rights and reciprocity among and between Maasai families
and clans and sections (Ndagala 1990a; Homewood and Rodgers 1991;
Potkanski 1994). Since Independence and ujamaa villagisation, official
processes for land allocation, operating through village governments,
interact with and override customary channels. These processes are
often overseen by groups that are more sedentary, with greater educa-
tional uptake and achievement and more familiar with administrative
systems (see, for example, Ole Kuney 1994). Maasai residents and in-
migrants in the NCA apply to their village land committee for farming
and building plots. Land in the NCA is in theory not open to private
ownership, though NCAA has granted leases to hotels and lodges (with
no legal right to do so) and has applied for tenure rights to the Con-
servation Area (Shivji and Kapinga 1998). Ownership of buildings in
the administrative centres to some extent confers de facto landowner-
ship, with land transactions couched in terms of the transfer of such
property. The formal system for the allocation of land favours those
involved in its organisation and is open to manipulation. The costs of
court proceedings mean that wealth and patronage commonly settle the
frequent disputes over access to land for building. Village government
(and land committee) membership is largely drawn from a small group
of resident Maasai elite educated men (see case study 4).
Case study 4: resident access to land in madukani
Some lifetime Maasai residents have acquired considerable property
portfolios. Four Maasai men are responsible for thirteen madukani rental
properties. All four are unusual in that they inherited wealth, had at least
primary school education and have been members of the village land
committee. Men who have been Village Chairman or Secretary own the
majority of rental properties. Such positions provide an opportunity to learn
how systems work, to develop useful networks and to diversify to protect
households from risk, such as livestock disease.
Wealthy non-Maasai in-migrants (civil servants, retired government
and NCAA employees, businessmen) are able to negotiate from the
land committee or buy building plots from individual residents (see
case study 5). Elsewhere in the NCA, similar patterns are found. For
example, in remote Naiyobi, in-migrant non-Maasai cultivators are
reported to access land through patron–client relations with politicians
outside the NCA.
Case study 5: in-migrant access to land in madukani
Government employees retire at fifty-five, and older civil servants tend to
diversify their occupations well before retiring. Government and NCAA
employees have started to request posting to Endulen in order to establish
businesses before retiring there. Common ventures include shops, bars
and transport services. In-migrants to madukani apply to the village land
committee for plots to build and/or cultivate. Outcomes depend on the
interplay of wealth and influence as opposed to customary rights in village
government decisions. One retired government official was able to acquire
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rights to land within madukani in order to build a bar, by offering an
arrangement for cheap or free beer to a Maasai resident who was a
known alcoholic and had land rights. Key informants suggest this is not
an unusual case.
The currently extremely sensitive nature of cultivation within the
NCA precluded data collection on areas of farmland controlled and/or
cultivated during the present study. Instead, the number of cultivated
fields (shambas) per household was recorded from key informants,
because of the unreliability of individual household responses. There
is no significant difference in the distribution of numbers of fields
cultivated by households of different ethnicity in Endulen madukani
(see FIGURE 4).
FIGURE 4 Percentage distribution of number of fields (shambas) by ethnicity,
Endulen madukani
Most (80%) residents of Endulen environs have one shamba, and
the rest have two or more. However, the variance is much greater
for residents of madukani and for recent in-migrants. A significant
proportion, particularly recent in-migrant kibarua households, has none
(see FIGURE 5).
Three-quarters of landless kibarua households have been able to
negotiate some access to much smaller cultivation plots (bustani,
‘gardens’). All kibarua households stated that they would like to
cultivate, but some were unable to access a shamba. In recent years
there has been a proliferation of religious organisations in Endulen, each
acquiring relatively large tracts of land for buildings. Key informants
stated church membership is one way for landless households to acquire
a shamba (see Hodgson 2001), but the areas accessed are typically very
small. At the other end of the scale, a higher proportion of madukani
residents and recent in-migrants have two, three or more shambas.
LIVELIHOODS IN KENYA AND TANZANIA MAASAILAND
This section summarises livelihoods data pertinent to issues of
resource access, exclusion and conflict. The authors are preparing a
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FIGURE 5 Percentage distribution of households by shamba holdings, ethnic-
ity and migrant status, Endulen madukani
companion paper which analyses livelihood change and diversification
in Maasailand with respect to ethnicity and migration status. Historical
data (Hodgson 2001) suggest this diversification has been taking place
over many years among the Maasai, since at least the 1950s. For most
people in both Kenyan and Tanzanian study areas, with the exception
of Endulen madukani, livelihood strategies depend primarily (85–100%
of households) on herding and/or small-scale farming (see FIGURE 6).
In Endulen madukani, around three-quarters of long-term residents (all
Maasai) but fewer than half of recent in-migrants (around half of whom
are Maasai) have livestock. Sikrar and Emarti have been pooled, as
FIGURE 6 Percentage of households reporting livelihood strategies, by location
and migrant status
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there are so few differences in the distribution of livelihoods by migrant
status. Income streams from wages and remittance have been pooled, as
have strategies associated with poverty such as casual labour (including
kibarua), charcoal and honey production.
The main points to take away from the summary of the distribution
of livelihoods by migrant status and location presented in FIGURE 6
are that:
• People in all sites are predominantly agropastoralist with the exception
of the trading settlement Endulen madukani, where significantly lower
proportions both of residents and more particularly of in-migrants have
livestock or fields.
• Only in Koiyaki, Lemek and Siana do households show a significant
participation in tourism earnings
• Recent in-migrants, both in Endulen madukani and in the Sikrar/Emarti
sites, show the highest involvement with strategies to alleviate poverty
(casual labour, charcoal, and honey).
• The long term Maasai residents of Endulen environs show least
engagement with livelihoods other than agropastoralism.
• Business and property rental are more common sources of income in
Endulen madukani than elsewhere.
Kenyan and Tanzanian Maasai rangelands are seen by outsiders as
dominated by people who are culturally and occupationally pastoralists,
themselves under pressure of invasion by farming in-migrants. Our
survey suggests a picture more closely consistent with a broadly
agropastoralist population undergoing the same general process of
diversification of rural livelihoods that is taking place across sub-Saharan
Africa (Ellis 2000; Bryceson and Jamal 1997; Bryceson 1999; Iliya and
Swindell 1997). This is taking place alongside in-migrant households
with a range of occupations from poverty strategies through to business
investment, depending on their circumstances. Our findings here are
supported by historical data showing a long trajectory of diversification
(Hodgson 2001).
Socio-political networks, exclusion and conflict
Both Kenyan and Tanzanian study areas experienced those processes
of loss of access to resources, exclusion of the less well-off by the more
wealthy and powerful, and ultimately the increasing tension and conflict
that have been outlined in an earlier section for Kenya and Tanzania
overall. In the Kenya study areas, machinations over land by the group
ranch elites were countered to some extent by group ranch members
enlisting the intervention of the district government. Appeals involve
travelling up to 150 km to Kirindon or Kilgoris District Officers, and
require influence and resources, mirroring processes observed elsewhere
in Kenya (Klopp 2001). These processes are illustrated in the following
three case studies.
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Case study 6: district government intervention in group ranch management, Kenya
At the time of the subdivision of Lemek, registered members were each
entitled to 100 acres of fertile or 128 acres of steeply sloping/marshy land.
All circumcised males deemed by the land adjudication committee to have
been resident on the group ranch prior to the closing of the register in
1993 were registered. According to Narok County Council there were 1,021
registered members on Lemek. Initial attempts by local elites to allocate
larger shares to themselves were thwarted in 1995, when a revised survey
was undertaken under the supervision of the District Commissioner to
ensure allocated plots were of equal size. [Thompson and Homewood 2002]
Case study 7: district government intervention in wildlife association/farming
association disputes, Kenya
In 1996, a group of educated men established a Farming Association on
Lemek group ranch, independent of the recognised group ranch committees
responsible for controlling land allocation and for running Koiyaki-Lemek
Wildlife Association. The Farming Association land lies in the MMNR
wildlife dispersal area, close to luxury tented camps from which group ranch
committee members draw income. At the time of first ploughing, the group
ranch Chairman tried to halt farming on the grounds of conflict with tourism
on the ranch in general, and operation of the luxury camps in particular.
The tented camp operators also threatened to vacate the area. The District
Officer was called on to resolve the issue, which he did in favour of the
Farming Association’s right to generate income for its members. The tour
operators have since stayed put. [Thompson and Homewood 2002]
Case study 8: ‘ethnic conflict’, violence and government involvement in Narok
In common with other parts of Kenya Maasailand the study areas
experienced violent ethnic clashes over land issues, peaking in the 1990s.
In Emarti in 1980–1984, violence erupted during group ranch member
registration, and oral histories suggest approximately 3,000 in-migrants were
chased out. Others stayed on, recognised by Maasai as having legitimate
claims. The land committee ensured physical separation by ethnicity through
grouping Kipsigis land titles to the west of Emarti. In Sikrar, similar violence
erupted in 1998–9, when title deeds were allocated on newly subdivided
Lemek. Sporadic fighting culminated in non-title-holding Kipsigis being
driven out towards established in-migrant settlements to the west. All
Kipsigis workers on Lemek wheat farms and Siana tourist lodges were
forcibly removed and some were killed in their places of work. Central
government later replaced key Kipsigis figures in Narok District, including
the District Commissioner, District Officer, and senior police personnel.
Local MPs, Maasai and Kipsigis leaders facilitated peace meetings, and
Kipsigis title deeds were allocated, again to the west of the area. Maasai land
sales and leasing to Kipsigis have subsequently resumed. [Interview book 1,
p. 67 (28/1/99), p. 114–115 (4/8/99), p. 147 (24/2/2001)]
These outbreaks of conflict followed the issuing of land title deeds.
During this period in our study areas, some Maasai benefited and
many Kipsigis lost and were killed or driven out. In North Narok,
comparable clashes are generally accepted to have been orchestrated by
President Moi’s power brokers in a ploy to disrupt multiparty elections
which threatened their power base (Klopp 2001). In other parts of
Maasailand, the ethnic dimension to these conflicts may be a more direct
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expression of existing tensions than a product of political manipulation.
Our results show ethnicity is strongly linked to access to resources in
Kenya—particularly land—but also of relatively more secure livelihoods,
irrespective of in-migrant or long-term resident status. For example,
48% of Kipsigis households report some involvement in business
compared with only 29% of Maasai. Our sample focuses on rural
smallholders, but it was clear that large landowners whether Maasai
or non-Maasai, long-term resident or recent in-migrant, were not
affected, suggesting the class dimension overrides ethnicity and duration
of residence.
In Tanzania, normal channels of representation operate through the
village, district, regional and national governments. The ‘legal quagmire’
of cumulative changes in land tenure law has left a situation where legally
defensible decisions with far-reaching implications are increasingly
made centrally without local knowledge or input. The impact of
Tanzanian national politics on local access to resources has been as
marked as in Kenya, and access has been as open to manipulation.
The situation in the NCA is even more extreme than for Kenya or that
outlined by Igoe and Brockington (1999) for other parts of Tanzanian
Maasailand, because the normal channels of representation and civil
administration are overridden by the NCAA’s own powers. In effect, the
area is governed by the NCA Authority, but this functions as a parastatal
not as a local government administration (Shivji and Kapinga 1998).
The NCA is meant to be a multiple-use area of land and the NCAA is
meant to have responsibility for community development and welfare
as much as for wildlife conservation, but in practice conservation has
taken priority since Independence (MLNRT 1990; Thompson, 1997).
For most of the three decades since its inception there was effectively no
representation or consultation and a harshly repressive attitude. In 1990
an ad-hoc ministerial commission on Ngorongoro recommended that:
• villages should have tenure
• the NCAA should hold regulatory powers
• the NCAA should have no tenurial rights
• a Pastoral Council should be constituted to liaise with the Authority and
provide a channel for residents’ concerns
In 1994 the Pastoral Council came into being. In practice it is
largely made up of ex officio members elected to local government
positions (Shivji and Kapinga 1998) with other priorities. Ex officio
members apart, in-migrant non-Maasai have proportionally much
greater representation than do resident Maasai. The extent to which the
Pastoral Council operates independently from the NCAA, or represents
the wider resident community, is in doubt (Shivji and Kapinga 1998;
Kaisoe and Ole Seki, 2002). The Pastoral Council has functioned as a
channel for negotiation in some instances of conflict (see case study 9).
Case study 9: conflict management between NCAA and residents, Tanzania
In 1997, NCA wardens under the head of the NCAA law enforcement unit
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attacked Maasai herders and cattle grazing in an area to which they had right
of access. This area was near, but not in, the Northern Highlands Forest
Reserve where grazing is not allowed. Herders were wounded, their spears
taken, and cattle wounded and scattered. Seven cattle subsequently died.
Some 500 warriors (moran) mobilised for conflict and the NCAA faced a
major crisis. The Pastoral Council acted as a channel for negotiations, which
resulted in compensation being paid to the owners of the livestock and to
the herders who were attacked, together with sanctions against the NCAA
official who had instigated the attack. It is not clear, however, that the official
concerned was dismissed, as demanded by the resident Maasai. [Shivji 1998]
However, there is considerable scope for local leaders to be dissuaded
from supporting their local communities’ interests (see case study 10).
Case study 10: cultivation bans, Tanzania
In 2001 the NCA conservator proclaimed a ban on cultivation and the
intention to evict all those who have entered the NCA since 1959. At the same
time, many migrant labourers were arbitrarily declared illegal in-migrants
and arrested and jailed for substantial terms. Maasai elders and women’s
representatives were deeply divided over the best way to respond. Local
representations to the Pastoral Council and the NCAA were not effective,
not least because elders were put under considerable pressure to agree with
the official position. It was agreed that women’s representatives should go to
Dar es Salaam to petition the President, as this would make clear that NCA
Maasai were making a peaceful representation about issues of fundamental
importance to livelihoods. The women’s delegation made the journey, but
came under considerable pressure from government representatives and
were eventually persuaded to return to NCA without having achieved
their audience.
Church groups, donor projects, NGOs and civil society organisations,
whether international or indigenous, may become informal channels
of representation (see Spear 1997; Hodgson 2001). However, they
occupy a precarious position, viewed with suspicion by the government
as potentially politically destabilising, and by local people as open to
manipulation by ambitious individuals (see Lissu 2000). Because of
their structure and composition they function more as pressure groups
than as representative bodies participating in local government (Shivji
and Kapinga 1998). Some conservation agencies function not only
as pressure groups but also as an integrated element in the NCAA
administration:
The Law Enforcement Department of the Authority is heavily financed
by the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) in terms of provision of
vehicles, uniforms and communications equipment (e.g. walkie-talkie radio
transmitters, etc). It is said the FZS financed the anti-cultivation operations
of 1987/8 during which pastoralist settlements were raided and their crops
burnt and slashed, and nearly 25 per cent of all pastoralist leaders were
arrested and fined and others incarcerated at the behest of the MNR
[Management of Natural Resources] officials (interviews with residents, 2–5
July 1997 . . .). [Shivji and Kapinga 1998: 23]
Most recently, and in clear contravention of the ad hoc ministerial
commission recommendations and historical agreements with the
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Maasai, the NCAA has sought title to the Conservation Area. Shivji and
Kapinga (op. cit.) point out this situation would be essentially illegal as
it would amount to a double allocation of land rights already held as
deemed rights of occupancy by the Maasai customary users. However,
the NCAA has for some time been issuing leases to tourist hotels as
though it did in fact hold such title. In Kenya this is mirrored by the
issuing of title deeds to politically connected lodge operators inside the
government gazetted Maasai Mara Game reserve (Thompson, Interview
book 1, p.114–115, [4/8/99]). Maasai rights in Ngorongoro are made
more complex by the delicate balance between the need to assert basic
human and constitutional rights, and the risk of eliciting repressive
measures from an administration that feels under threat, particularly
from international human rights advocacy (Shivji and Kapinga 1998).
CONCLUSION
This paper has analysed the patterns and implications of in-migration
and ethnicity in East African Maasai rangelands under contrasting
Kenyan and Tanzanian macroeconomic and macropolitical contexts. It
compares patterns and mechanisms of access to land, livelihoods, and
socio-political networks for residents and in-migrants of different eth-
nicities in areas with strong cultural and ecological continuities between
Kenya and Tanzania. This conclusion considers the implications of our
findings for the role of in-migration in the moderation of poverty, social
exclusion and conflict.
Both Kenya and Tanzania are seen as having been relatively stable
due to their comparative equality of opportunities, whether economic
(Kenya) or political (Tanzania) (Klugman et al. 1999). However, below
the national level, pastoralist groups have been consistently marginalised
in Kenya and Tanzania (Igoe and Brockington 1999; Shivji and
Kapinga 1998; Lane 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Markakis 1999) and across
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (Galaty and Bonte 1992). From this
viewpoint, pastoralist groups such as the Maasai are differentiated from
the rest of the national population in terms of ethnic, economic, and
environmental stresses and also in terms of social services provision.
Divergence along these dimensions has been identified as leading to
instability, conflict and violence (Hussein 1998; Stewart 2002).
Our study documents levels of differentiation between and within
groups in Maasailand that belie the postulated equality of economic
opportunity in Kenya, and of political participation in Tanzania. In
Kenya, processes of land allocation have resulted in many people
keeping only a tenuous foothold in agropastoral livelihoods, having
adverse knock-on effects on their access to natural resources (Southgate
and Hulme 1996, 2000) or losing their rights of access altogether
(Rutten 1992), and being dispossessed by ‘legal’ or illegal means
(Munei and Galaty 1999), with serious repercussions (Hodgson 2001;
Talle 1988). Our results show the rights of some long-term residents of
different ethnicities have been less secure than those of more recently in-
migrant Maasai in the study areas. Kenya politicians have used disorder
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as a political instrument, raising tensions over land allocation in Maasai
areas, deflecting discontent through attacks on vulnerable scapegoats,
so as to manipulate election results through intimidation and ethnic
conflict (Klopp 2001; Dietz 1996). Here it has been the well-off rather
than the dispossessed who have pursued violence, manoeuvring to
consolidate control. The instigators of Kenya’s ‘ethnic clashes’ played
on existing tensions arising from rapid in-migration (Klopp 2001) and
systematic dispossession of poorer Maasai (Munei and Galaty 1999),
though many less well-off rural people resisted having their ethnic
affiliation and legitimate concerns exploited for political ends (Klopp
2002). In the aftermath of violence, wealth and power emerges in our
study as a major dimension of resource access in Kenya Maasailand,
linked to ethnicity (favouring Maasai in areas formerly within the
colonial Maasai reserve).
In Tanzania, rural populations have been left vulnerable to loss of land
and livelihoods by the confused legacy of land law created by successive
periods of colonial administration, ujamaa villagisation and economic
liberalisation (Shivji 1998). Tanzania in theory gives legal status to
some customary land rights, but in practice disregards them (McAuslan
2000). Central government and its representatives may legally grant
land leases to investors without consulting or compensating the local
users dispossessed by the transfer. Mobile pastoralist populations have
suffered more than many in this process, and the events in Maasai
rangelands have been well documented (Brockington 2002; Igoe and
Brockington 1999; Africa Watch 1990). There have been recent
and increasing instances of ethnic clashes over land and access to
key resources in Tanzania Maasailand (Otieno 2002a, 2002b; Dean
2000; Kiondo 2002). Officially, ethnicity is not an issue: in truth,
the Tanzanian government regards issues, analyses and organisations
focusing on ethnicity as potentially destabilising (Cameron 2001).
In line with work by Ole Kuney (1994), Igoe and Brockington
(1999) and Brockington (2002), our study shows that beneath this
denial of ethnicity as an important dimension, there are indications
of systematic discrimination against the rural Maasai agropastoralist
population.11 The virtual absence of ethnic pattern in our findings
on access to farmland in the NCA, despite the long Maasai
demographic and military pre-eminence in this area, underlines this
point. The parastatal administration of the study area by the NCA
allows pastoral residents very limited channels of representation or
consultation and regularly overrules their constitutional (and human)
rights. Agropastoralist access to education, land, and non-farm
livelihoods including employment with the thriving tourist industry
is severely limited by the NCAA administration. The NCAA prioritises
conservation (despite its brief for development) and overrides normal
channels and laws. By contrast, in-migrant non-Maasai appear to have
proportionally better representation (Shivji and Kapinga 1998). They
11 Cf. the silent discrimination against San in Botswana (Hitchcock 1990, 1996).
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are able to secure land grants from village governments and/or leases
from the NCAA, at the expense of the local rural population, despite the
lack of any legal basis for the NCAA to issue such leases. Other aspects
of natural resource use are similarly stacked against local pastoralists.
Legal appeals and violent protest are on the increase, despite eliciting
punitive measures (Brockington 2002; Lane 1996b, 1996c; MNRT
1997; Shivji 1998; Shivji and Kapinga 1998).
The common predictors of violent conflict (Stewart 2002) are all
visible in the NCA. The ethnic differences may be silent but appear
deep-rooted. The economic differentials are intensifying: the relatively
uniform nature of the long-term resident rural population is giving
way to madukani’s mix of, on the one hand, landless households
dependent on casual labour and poverty strategies, and, on the other,
well-off officials and businessmen. There is a long-running struggle
for control of the hot spot of valuable environmental resources the
conservation area represents. The NCA is a premier tourist destination
earning over 50% of Tanzania’s game viewing fees (Leader-Williams
2000). It is generally understood this revenue bankrolls Chama cha
Mapinduzi, the ruling party in Tanzania, and senior representatives of
the NCAA have repeatedly stated its intention to restrict further and
ultimately evict the pastoralist population, despite the official mandate
it holds for joint community development and wildlife conservation.
The social contract that should give people some security at least
of human and constitutional rights is barely in evidence. Despite
Tanzania’s avowed adoption of community conservation policies, this
highest earning of conservation areas is unable to manage community
development so as to achieve health, education, water or transport
infrastructures that approach national average standards. Where such
services are installed they are largely monopolised by privileged in-
migrant elites. International conservation organisations equip, arm and
train paramilitary forces used by the NCAA to control or coerce the
local population: harassment is common, violence and even executions
well documented (Shivji 1998).
This paper originated in response to an increasingly strong assump-
tion, both in the literature and among local people, that in-migration is
leading to increased competition for key resources, which in turn may
drive poverty and social exclusion on the one hand, and conflict and vio-
lence on the other. It has shown that economic and political systems that
are relatively equitable at the national level (Klugman et al. 1999) may
conceal marked inequalities between groups at the local and regional
level. These differences are predictors of conflict but the inequalities
displayed in our findings are not associated in any simple way with
in-migration. The inequalities are shaped by national context and, in
Kenya, they show an ethnic dimension, but the overriding association
is with wealth and power, rather than ethnicity or in-migrant status. It
is the political economy of land appropriation which primarily drives
conflict in Maasailand. State violence is a major contributor, causing
exclusion, eviction and extinction of rights, whether disguised as in
Kenya, or direct as in Tanzania where a cumulative 30% of the land has
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progressively been gazetted as protected areas in which local land use is
restricted or forbidden (Brockington 2002; IUCN 1987). In both coun-
tries, state violence has been responsible for hundreds (if not thousands)
of deaths and for the displacement of tens of thousands of people, who in
turn become the poorest of migrants drifting through the East African
rangelands,12 or completely excluded and camped, for example, in
churchyards locally (see case study 3 above), or elsewhere in conditions
akin to refugee status, for example at Limuru near Nairobi or Malea
near Naivasha (Klopp 2001, 2002). Any programme aiming to reduce
poverty, enhance social cohesion, and ultimately reduce the potential
for violent conflict, needs a better understanding of these processes.
In both Kenya and Tanzania, processes of intervention and change
in land tenure have repeatedly allowed elites to manoeuvre to their
own advantage. Land allocation systems have been problematic and
consistently work for those organising them. In both countries this
favours the well-off. In Kenya Maasailand, for historical reasons, this
includes a substantial Maasai elite and smallholder/landowner class;
while in Tanzania, few Maasai agropastoralists but many well-off in-
migrants dominate the process. Appeals in land allocation disputes
are not easily accessed, are open to corruption, and plural legal
systems increase the chances of conflict. Dispossession and exploitation
have combined to initiate a political alliance among educated young
professionals from pastoralist groups in Kenya. Focusing on issues of
land, education and political representation, this forms a new channel
to discuss and put forward pastoralist concerns through civil society
processes (Markakis 1999). In Tanzania, Maasai residents have been
isolated from and bypassed by political processes, which are dominated
by an administration with few pretensions to balanced local government.
The struggle between conservation interests and human rights is unlikely
to be resolved in any positive way for the agropastoralist population of
the NCA in the foreseeable future.
Reviews of tenure, access and conflict management in rangeland areas
have emphasised the need to foster systems for negotiated access that
can better accommodate multiple user groups within the social, spatial
and temporal variability so characteristic of African arid and semi-
arid lands (Behnke 1993; Niamir-Fuller 1999; Scoones 1995; Toulmin
and Quan 2000). However, when such different trajectories of tenure
reform have had such comparably adverse impacts on vulnerable people
in both systems, is further review of land titling procedures likely to
improve things? Any such review needs to take account of the way every
change has offered opportunities for the well-placed to increase their
control at the expense of the poor, not only in Kenya and Tanzania, but
more widely (McAuslan 2000). Pathways to reduce tensions must make
access to education, political representation and job opportunities more
equitable for residents and in-migrants, whatever their ethnicity. In
particular, the lack of equitable and effective channels of representation
12 See, for example, Igoe and Brockington (1999) on the Usangu Plains.
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for both residents and in-migrants currently forms a major barrier
to civil society in East African rangelands. This is being tentatively
addressed through current initiatives for poverty reduction throughout
sub-Saharan Africa which are already targeting rapid expansion of
education in areas such as the NCA—though there are fundamental
problems with the lack of infrastructure and teachers (see Carr-Hill
2002; Bishop 2003). Any results will have a long lead-in time: in the
meanwhile, insecurity of tenure, denial of access to the basic resources
for rural agropastoral livelihoods, and the potential for violent conflict
are increasingly explosive issues which need immediate attention.
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ABSTRACT
East African rangelands have a long history of population mobility linked to
competition over key resources, negotiated access, and outright conflict. Both
in the literature and in local discourse, in-migration is presented as leading
to increased competition, driving poverty and social exclusion on the one
hand, and conflict and violence on the other. Current analyses in developing
countries identify economic differences, ethnic fault lines, ecological stresses
and a breakdown in state provision of human and constitutional rights as
factors in driving conflict. The present paper explores this interaction of
in-migration and conflict with respect to Kenyan and Tanzanian pastoralist
areas and populations. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, patterns of
resource access and control in Kenya and Tanzania Maasailand are explored
in terms of the ways land and livestock are associated with migration status,
ethnicity and wealth or political class. Contrasts and similarities between
the two national contexts are used to develop a better understanding of the
ways these factors operate under different systems of tenure and access. The
conclusion briefly considers implications of these patterns, their potential for
exacerbating poverty, and policies for minimising social exclusion and conflict
in East African rangelands.
RE´SUME´
Les prairies d’Afrique orientale connaissent depuis longtemps une mobilite´
des populations, lie´e aux proble`mes de concurrence pour les ressources cle´s,
d’acce`s ne´gocie´ et de conflits pures et simples. Dans la litte´rature comme
dans le discours local, l’immigration interne est pre´sente´e comme cause de
concurrence accrue, motrice de pauvrete´ et d’exclusion sociale d’une part,
et de conflit et de violence d’autre part. Des analyses mene´es actuellement
dans les pays en de´veloppement identifient comme facteurs moteurs de conflit
des e´carts e´conomiques, des failles ethniques, des tensions e´cologiques et
une de´te´rioration des droits humains et constitutionnels. Cet article examine
l’interaction entre immigration interne et conflit au sein des re´gions et
populations pastorales du Kenya et de la Tanzanie. Il utilise des me´thodes
quantitatives et qualitatives pour e´tudier les mode`les d’acce`s et de controˆle
des ressources dans le pays masaı¨ du Kenya et de la Tanzanie en termes
d’association des terres et du be´tail au statut d’immigration, a` l’ethnicite´ et a` la
cate´gorie de richesse ou politique. Les contrastes et similarite´s entre les deux
contextes nationaux servent a` mieux comprendre le mode de fonctionnement
de ces facteurs dans des re´gimes fonciers et syste`mes d’acce`s diffe´rents. La
conclusion examine brie`vement les implications de ces mode`les, leur capacite´
a` exacerber la pauvrete´ et les politiques de minimisation de l’exclusion sociale
et des conflits dans les prairies d’Afrique orientale.
